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The political geography of Europe has, for centuries, been based around the borders of 
its nation-states. The ability of the nation-state to control its territory and police its 
borders has been essential to the practices of war and diplomacy, the legitimacy of 
governments, immigration policies and trade. But processes of globalization and 
European Union (EU) integration have transformed the borders of Europe and the 
nation-states within it. While globalization theorists tend to posit an opening up of 
borders to global flows of capital, information and people, the changed nature of the 
border is itself often left unexamined and it is assumed that borders have simply 
disappeared. Some scholars and activists, however, are now arguing that, rather than 
fading away, borders are proliferating in the globalized world and their functions 
spreading into many different areas of society. This article examines the transformation 
of the ‘classical’ border of the nation-state into a number of new forms, using the work 
of theorists such as Balibar (2004a, 2004b), Mezzadra (2004), Rigo (2005) and Walters 
(2004). It then examines how these theories have been applied in recent literature, and 
in particular Chris Rumford’s (2006) analysis of the European Neighbourhood policy 
and his argument that this represents a ‘cosmopolitanization’ of European borders. 
 
The classical border 
The history of the modern nation-state begins in Europe in 1648 with the Treaty of 
Westphalia. Borders were from the very beginning an essential component of this new 
political form; the key terms of the Treaty were exclusive sovereignty over the state’s 
particular territory, and the clear delineation of the borders between the conflicting 
Spruce         The Cosmopolitanization of the EU’s Borders? 
 
powers, the French and Swedish states and the principalities of the Holy Roman Empire. 
The Treaty established one of the most important aspects of sovereignty at the time, the 
principle of ‘cuius regio, eius religio’; that is, each state could determine the religious 
practice within its territory (Green 1954, 324). With the Treaty the role of the Holy 
Roman Empire began its decline, marking ‘the end of the medieval conception of 
Europe which had long been dying and the emergence of the modern state’ (Green 1954, 
326). 
 
However it is not until the nineteenth century that the nation-state in Europe fully comes 
into being (Agnew 2003) when European nationalisms and the colonial ambitions of 
European states became dominant. At this time the European nation-state model is 
exported around the world and, Rigo (2005) argues, comes to dominate all other forms 
of geopolitical divisions: ‘The world-wide success of the territorial system of national 
states transformed every frontier of expansion into a boundary between homogenous 
and symmetrical political entities, overshadowing all other meanings of political and 
territorial borders.’ Mezzadra (2004) argues that this is the time of the ‘classical’ 
concept of the border, marking out a direct geophysical correspondence between nation, 
state, and territory. He quotes Georg Jellinek’s (1900) argument that the unitary nature 
of the territory of the state, that is the clarity of its borders and the absence of 
overlapping territories and sovereignty, is one of the essential elements of the state’s 
definition. The German school of political geography in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, of which Jellinek was a member, took the theorization of the border 
as an important part of its work. One of its leading figures, Ratzel, wrote of the need to 
divide up and apportion territory into bordered areas: ‘Every State is a portion of 
humanity and a portion of territory. Man is unthinkable without land, and much less the 
greatest works of man on the planet, that is the State’ (1897, 2). 
 
The division and bordering of both territory and people is viewed as a fundamental 
component of the establishment of the nation-state. Similarly, the British imperial 
administrator Lord Curzon, whose work involved drawing up the borders of Britain’s 
colonies, argued that unitary borders and defined territories were the basis on which 
states were founded; indeed, ‘the integrity of its borders is the condition for existence of 
the State’ (1907, 2). Borders were also essential to international order and for Curzon 
were thus ‘the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, 
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of life or death to nations’ (1907, 2). 
 
Balibar argues that these types of borders are as much a product of modernity as the 
nation-state itself, replacing pre-modern boundary forms, such as ‘marches’ and ‘limes’ 
(2004b, 3).1 The nation-state drew together administrative, juridical, fiscal, military and 
even linguistic functions into a particular territory, controlled by a monopolistic state 
power. Without the border in its classical definition the nation-state as we know it 
would not have been possible. But despite the predominance of nation-state borders, 
other boundaries have also marked the European continent. The historian Ferdinand 
Braudel (1976) has traced the emergence of the Mediterranean as a border between the 
lands on its north and south shores. Prior to the sixteenth century, he argues, it had been 
primarily a space of connection and interaction between the countries that lie on its 
shores (Braudel 1976; Driessen 1998), but from the 1500s it developed into a barrier, 
leading to differential social and economic development that has continued into our own 
times. Another example of a boundary beyond the borders of the nation-state was the 
iron curtain, separating non-Communist Europe from the Soviet Union and other 
Communist countries after the Second World War.  
 
The transformation of borders 
After the collapse of Communism and the major advances in the integration of the EU 
in the 1990s, the borders of European nation-states have undergone profound changes. 
The work of analysing European borders, of course, is essential to the study of Europe 
and its relationships with the regions on its edges. But Europe’s borders have also had 
important impacts at a global level and their influence continues today. Balibar argues 
that the process of drawing borders in Europe was also, in the epoch of European 
colonization, a process of dividing up the whole earth, as Europe considered itself the 
centre of the world (2004a, 7). European boundaries were extended from Europe to 
cover the globe, drawing borders through territories in Africa, Asia and the Americas 
and assigning them to particular European powers (which themselves were defined by 
their territorial existence). 
 
Today, Europe’s borders continue to be an important object of analysis. Mezzadra (in 
                                                 
1 A march is a zone between two territories where there is interaction and assimilation between two or 
more peoples. I discuss Walters’s use of limes later in this essay. 
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Bojadzijev & Saint-Saens 2006) has argued that important qualities of the EU itself can 
be identified through its borders. He uses the work of Beck and Grande (2004) to 
suggest that the EU’s borders are metonymic of the EU, particularly in its move to a 
postfordist ‘flexible’ capitalism. In particular, he sees in the flexibility and mobility of 
European borders a key characteristic of the institutional architecture of the European 
Union itself. 
 
The transformations in its borders, then, can provide a new perspective on the direction 
of the EU and the integration process. Flexibility need not only be associated with 
postmodern capitalism. The flexibilization and deterritorialization of Europe’s borders 
and the blurring of the in/out, us/them, and nation-state/federation dichotomies 
(Outhwaite 2006) has the potential to lead to a desirable outcome, to the sort of 
cosmopolitan, ‘reflexive’ Europe envisaged by Beck and Grande: ‘Europe is another 
word for variable geometry, variable national interests, variable concern (Betroffenheit), 
variable internal and external relations, variable statehood’ (2004, 16). 
 
The borders of the European Union also have a more direct influence on its character, it 
is argued, through the way that the border regime creates the conditions of possibility 
for the ‘extracomunitari’ to exist inside the EU: ‘Their function is not only one of 
control but also of inclusive selection. Their transformation is closely related to the 
development of European citizenship and the management of migration flows, and the 
border regime itself ‘produces’ the foreigner’ (Mezzadra in Bojadzijev and Saint-Saens 
2006). Borders not only block or control flows, they also produce them. Bauman (1997, 
17) similarly argues that the EU’s borders produce ‘otherness,’ that the stranger is 
created through the mechanisms of the border.  
 
Balibar’s four geospatial dimensions of Europe 
Before considering how the transformation of Europe’s borders has been theorised, it is 
useful to consider spatial theories of Europe as a whole. One of the most compelling 
frameworks for understanding these theories comes from Balibar’s ‘Humboldt Lecture 
in Human Geography’ (2004b), in which he sets out four different patterns or 
dimensions to Europe and its borders. Balibar argues that in the current global age we 
no longer live on the edge of a simple international ‘borderline,’ as we did in the Cold 
War. ‘Rather we are situated increasingly in the midst of an ubiquitous and multiple 
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border’ which connects almost all parts of the world with each other, a ‘World-border.’ 
The territorial sovereignty of the state has been dismantled progressively over the last 
few decades, with some border functions being reinforced (police functions, 
immigration control), others weakened and separated from the borderline (e.g. monetary 
independence, fiscal control). In Europe this has linked up with the EU integration 
process: European borders have been rendered open to indefinite expansion along the 
current model of a confederation of states (Balibar 2004b). 
 
Balibar posits four dimensions to the European political space, each of them also being 
a different way of understanding the border within it. The first is that of Samuel 
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (1993), whereby the world’s conflicts largely 
become religious and cultural, or ‘civilizational,’ and the borders or faultlines of these 
conflicts lie in multicultural states. Europe itself is becoming a major faultline or 
intermediary zone of competition between rival civilizations. 
 
The second dimension draws on the models of Castells (1996) and Sassen (1996, 98), 
who propose that circulation processes (and deterritorialization) become more important 
than territoriality and territorialization. Boundaries are still significant, but they are 
always being transgressed, and diasporic and nomadic subjects start to assert their 
control and become the norm, rather than the rooted or embedded subjects of the nation-
state. When these ideas are applied to Europe, Balibar argues, they tend to phantomize 
the continent: the flows of capital, population, communication and political action all go 
through Europe but never elect it as a permanent site (2004b, 10). Europe is 
deterritorialized and delocalized, becoming more part of the imaginary and less part of 
the real. 
 
The third dimension sees the EU structured around central states, with increasing 
concentric circles of belonging, moving out from France and Germany to the states that 
do not yet have the Euro, and to the newly joined states, candidate states, and neighbour 
states that are unlikely to become part of Europe, but that will always be close and 
economically integrated into it in some ways. The distance from the core to the 
periphery is a political distance rather than a geographical or physical one. Further from 
the centre it is harder to draw boundaries, and borders appear more and more like 
medieval marches or limes. In the final dimension, that of cross-over/overlapping folds, 
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there are no centres, only peripheries, the overlaps of one area (or centre, perhaps) on 
another. These marches are characterized by hybridity and cultural invention, and in this 
sense the Balkan ‘patchwork’ can be seen as the epitome of Europe rather than as an 
exceptional area. 
 
Walter’s analysis of the deterritorialized border 
Walters (2004) draws on Balibar’s work in his analysis of EU borders, examining the 
mechanisms and technologies used to police and control frontier spaces. He argues that 
while national borders remain the preeminent boundaries in geopolitics, the borders 
around regional blocs are also becoming geopolitically significant. He uses the idea of 
geostrategy to look at developments around regional borders, and identifies several 
important geostrategies, each of which involves a particular way of territorializing the 
space of the border. 
 
The first is that of the Networked (Non)border which builds on and deepens the second 
spatial dimension discussed by Balibar, that of circulation processes and 
deterritorialization. It involves ‘the removal of border controls from fixed positions 
along the geographical borderlines of most EU states’ and their replacement with 
‘networks of control’ (Walters 2004, 679-680). The Networked (Non)border resonates 
with the themes of deterritorialization and visions of ‘borderless worlds’ and conforms 
to neoliberal principles aimed at the removal of obstacles to the free movement of 
peoples, goods and services. Despite this rhetoric, however, it should be recognised that 
the removal of border controls brings with it new forms of regulation, for example: 
cross-border police cooperation, mobile surveillance teams on each side of the border, 
exchange of information between states, harmonization of migration and asylum policy, 
and the recognition of common standards in border management. 
 
One example of these developments is the way that the Schengen regime replaces 
internal borders with external zones of police co-operation, which is to say that the old 
border is being dispersed or diffused, a process of deterritorialization. Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980, 17) argue, however, that any movement of deterritorialization will be 
linked with a process of reterritorialization that ‘striates, draws lines, fixes, orders, 
localises and segments’ (Walters 2004). So as this new geostrategy disconnects one 
particular territorial relationship it establishes at the same time new relationships with 
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the geophysical environment in which it is located. There is a movement of 
reterritorialization, a new method of policing these borders and marking out this land, 
and a new territory emerges from the old one, cutting across and emerging tangentially 
from it. 
 
The police forces on both sides of the border work together to keep the border secure, 
reconfiguring themselves as networks involving joint tasks that take the same 
networked form. 
 
Rather than a line which divides armed installations, or a zone of confrontation, the border 
becomes a joint responsibility and the locus of a new practice of police cooperation … The 
enemy is the networks, gangs, terrorists which cut across/under borders …. under this 
dispensation the logic is to unite the police agencies and authorities across borders in the name of 
a perpetual struggle or war against a postnational (and postpolitical) enemy. (Walters 2004, 682) 
 
Instead of the edge or the wall, the border becomes a strategic node within a 
transnational network of control. The Networked (Non)border also points away from the 
border as a contiguous space, a kind of skin for the state. The space of border control is 
disconnected from the politico-territorial borders of the state so that, for instance, there 
is much more concentration of border control at airports, far within the geophysical 
borders of the state, than there is along the physical border. 
 
March 
The Networked (Non)border model suggests a growth in the processes of 
deterritorialization in Europe, but conversely it also indicates that we should remain 
alert for new territorializations. The old border areas of Eastern Europe which were 
known as marches may well be fertile grounds for these processes. The word ‘Ukraine,’ 
for instance, means borderland. Eastern European states are now seen as a buffer zone 
or march between Western Europe and the crumbling chaos of the Soviet Union, and 
more generally as a barrier to the flows of refugees and economic migrants. The ‘safe 
third country’ provisions in European migration agreements exemplify these zones. As 
Mezzadra and Nielsen (2003) have explained, under these provisions ‘a number of 
states contiguous to the EU have been identified as “safe third countries,” meaning that 
if a migrant passes through one of these territories on their way to the EU, they can now 
be returned to that country.’ 
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Agreements are also made between these safe third countries and others further away 
from the ‘core’ of Western Europe: 
 
Rigo (2002) describes how agreements for expulsion between EU nations and so-called ‘safe 
third countries’ are in turn supplemented by agreements between these ‘safe third countries’ and 
nations further afield from the powerful Western European states. For example, a migrant who 
enters Germany through Poland can be expelled to Poland, which in turn has signed agreements 
with the Ukraine, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. (Mezzadra and Nielsen 2003) 
 
As border technologies are exported from Europe’s west, a system of increasingly 
difficult border crossings is established and linked to the territories that have been 
integrated, or have the possibility of being integrated, into the EU. But the march can 
also be diffuse and detached from a territory, just as networks can. So the ever larger 
space, over which are stretched carrier-liability provisions, liaison officers, visa policies 
and other measures to intercept unwanted immigration before it reaches the border, 
becomes an extended march. 
 
The colonial frontier 
As well as the Networked (Non)border and the march, Walters turns to two strategies 
derived from colonialism and imperial borders to help explain the complexities of the 
EU’s borders. His justification for this is that as the EU incorporates more and more 
diverse nation-states into its territory and its borders expand, it comes to share 
characteristics with imperial regimes. The metaphor of the EU as empire has been taken 
up in many analyses, as Walters notes: 
 
With the likelihood of further enlargement, and of an asymmetrical and multi-speed integration 
project, ‘both NATO and the European Union may begin to look more like traditional empires, 
with [the distinction] between centre and periphery becoming almost as important as the 
distinction between members and non-members.’(Walters 2004, 686, quoting Hassner 1997) 
 
Walters argues that the ideology of the colonial frontier espoused by Frederick Jackson 
Turner in his 1893 essay, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’ (1920), 
can be useful in analysing current developments in the EU’s borders, particularly its 
expansion into Eastern Europe. While acknowledging the racialized and ethnocentric 
basis of Turner’s work, and its central role in justifying the westward colonial expansion 
of white America into Native American lands, Walters still believes that the Turnerian 
frontier thesis provides a tool with which to name ‘a certain kind of border strategy’ in 
the EU context (Walters 2004, 687).  
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The danger with Walter’s approach is that in applying the colonial American frontier 
model to the EU, injustices, errors of analysis and racialized and colonialist viewpoints 
similar to those applied on the ‘frontiers’ of the USA may be replicated in analyses of 
the European sphere. The qualifications that Walters applies—he is aware that Turner’s 
work ‘betrays many of the racial and ethnocentric assumptions of its time’ (Walters 
2004, 686) but argues that once this is recognised as objectionable Turner’s ideas can 
still be used—might be valid if the unpalatable elements could be neatly excised from 
Turner’s theory. It is not possible to do this, however, as Turner’s racialized and 
colonialist assumptions are fundamental to his frontier thesis. 
 
As an example of this, one of the central elements in Turner’s model of the frontier is 
the notion that the areas through which the frontier expands are a ‘wilderness,’ occupied 
by ‘savagery’ rather than ‘civilization.’ Similar to the doctrine of terra nullius that was 
applied to Australia, this logic denies the legitimacy of Native American peoples and 
their claims to territory. As Turner put it, by expanding through this ‘wilderness’ space 
the frontier creates the new land and identity of America (Turner 1920, 3). This logic 
cannot be simply excised from Turner’s theory as a typical racialized and cultural 
perspective of his time, given that the logic itself provides a key structuring element of 
his frontier thesis. Indeed, that logic is what Walters introduces into his own analysis of 
the EU’s expanding eastern frontier; as the EU border passes through the marches of 
Eastern Europe and expands the EU zone, it produces a new EU.  
 
Walter’s argument is therefore subject to the same critiques as Turner’s. Positing a 
wilderness or blank space through which the border expands effaces and ignores the 
histories, cultures and societies that already inhabit the territory in question. This 
effacing thus enables Walters to argue that the colonial frontier ‘represents a zone where 
an organised power meets its outside in a relationship of transformation and assimilation. 
It is the setting of an asymmetrical relationship in which the expanding power assumes a 
right to define what is appropriate and just’ (2004, 688). 
 
A necessary critical response to this approach is to understand and bring out the 
importance of the people and societies that existed in these spaces prior to and during 
this colonising process. Despite his adoption of Turner’s model, Walters does also look 
at these arguments in the EU context, providing a counterpoise to the idea that the EU’s 
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expansion eastwards is a simple process of articulating Eastern European states into the 
EU system. 
 
Rather than passing through a zone of emptiness or ‘wilderness’ in the integration 
process the EU has to interact with the norms and values already in place and its 
expansion involves the disruption of settled regional, economic and geopolitical 
relations. It is not just the articulation into the new EU network that should be examined 
but the disarticulation from the old networks, such as the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
bloc.  
 
Eastern Europe was not ‘unintegrated’ before the EU; rather it was integrated in 
different systems. For instance, the Ukraine is often characterised as a state struggling to 
achieve democracy (through the Orange Revolution, for example) and to achieve the 
level of political development required for it to join the EU. Russia is depicted as an 
outside, undemocratic influence. However this understanding effaces the history of the 
Ukraine’s connection with Russia. One of the meanings of the word Ukraine is 
‘outskirt,’ and the country was named in this way because of its position not as a 
European outskirt but as an outskirt of the Russian empire. The predominance of the EU 
as a regional system should not be assumed, and in the Ukraine’s case the EU must be 
seen as a secondary regional system to that in which the country has been enmeshed 
historically.  
 
Limes 
As well as the geostrategies described above that connect up two different areas, 
Walters (2004) also reintroduces to debates on European space the concept of the limes, 
which represents an edge, a fringe, a limit. It is between a power and its outside, in 
some ways like the colonial frontier described above. However, ‘whereas the 
expansionary frontier reflects an aspiration to assimilate, to stabilise through expansion 
and colonisation, the limes draws a line’ (Walters 2004, 691). Walters identifies limes 
across the Mediterranean, drawing a line between the North and South, between Europe 
and Africa. A good example is the wall built around the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, on 
the Moroccan coast, to keep African immigrants out. 
 
In contrast to Walters, Michael Mann names limes as part of an ‘exclusive’ or 
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‘ostracising’ imperialism (2001, 53). It is useful to keep this in mind as a 
counterexample to the rhetoric of the universality of globalization, with one part of the 
world economy dominating that of the other. The limes can be used to exclude one 
section of the globe from the Western globalized order, cutting it off from markets and 
flows of finance, technology, goods, information or labour. The problem for those on 
the outside, as Hirst and Thompson argue, is ‘not imperial domination or attempts to 
annex their resources, it is neglect and exclusion’ (1995, 419). 
 
These geostrategies are not exclusive and more than one can apply to each border, but 
usually one will be dominant. For example the Mediterranean border can be seen as a 
limes with the Euro-Mediterranean partnership strengthening the geophysical boundary 
between Europe and Africa. But with its zones of cooperation, and regional assistance 
for good government, the Mediterranean border can also be seen as seeking to transform 
the limes into a colonial frontier like the one gradually moving through Europe’s eastern 
nation-states. And the increased cooperation in policing the boundaries between North 
and South also has elements of the Networked (Non)border. 
 
Rumford: cosmopolitan borders 
In a recent essay, ‘Borders and rebordering,’ Rumford (2006) explores the analyses of 
the EU space by Balibar and Walters described above, and argues that the EU’s borders 
are being ‘cosmopolitanized.’ The concept of the cosmopolitan border is based on the 
argument that ‘borders and mobilities are not antithetical.’ Rather they are both 
intertwined: ‘Borders connect the ‘inner mobility’ of our lives both with the multiplicity 
of communities we may elect to become members of and the cross-cutting tendencies of 
polities to impose their border regimes on us in ways which compromise our mobilities, 
freedoms, rights and even identities’ (Rumford 2006, 183). Cosmopolitanism becomes a 
necessary part of these structures, understood here ‘as an orientation to the world which 
entails the constant negotiation and crossing of borders … A cosmopolitan lives in and 
across borders’ (183). 
 
At first glance the idea that borders and mobilities are not opposed to each other seems 
nonsensical. The increasingly sophisticated border controls implemented by states 
around the world are testament to the checks and prohibitions on mobility embodied in 
contemporary borders. It is true that Rumford does not seem to give significant weight 
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to the power of the border security apparatus, and to the obstacles and dangers that it 
poses for those crossing of borders without authorisation, and I shall deal with this issue 
more fully below. However his argument usefully shifts emphasis away from borders 
merely as obstacles to movement and towards borders as connections between 
territories. Referring to Sassen’s work (1996), he argues that ‘borders should not be 
thought of only as dividing lines, but as circuits which cut across two or more 
discontinuous systems’ (Rumford 2006, 187). Borders link up as well as divide. 
 
Rumford uses this perspective on borders to critique two models of European space and 
border areas, those that he terms ‘Schengenland’ and ‘Network Europe.’ In the first 
model, the Schengen process is deemed to have turned the EU into a space where 
internally borders have disappeared, while the external borders of the EU have been 
hardened and securitised. Such a perspective sees borders only as barriers to movement 
and ignores the potential for linking and connection between the EU’s Mediterranean 
and Eastern European neighbours through their respective border areas. The Network 
Europe model, on the other hand, effaces borders as it posits Europe as a place of capital, 
information and labour flows that are eroding the traditional boundaries of the nation-
state. It is hard to justify this view of an increasingly borderless world, however, in the 
face of the proliferation of national and regional border controls in recent times. If 
borders are seen as providing connections between territories, controlling and 
facilitating flows as well as stopping them, then a more credible analytical model can be 
provided. This idea corresponds to one of the border typologies developed by Walters 
(2004), that of the Networked (Non)border, which highlights the way that the border is 
no longer just a dividing space but rather a node connecting networks inside and outside 
a territory. 
 
Along with his critique of Schengenland and networked Europe spatial models, 
Rumford argues that there is a ‘cosmopolitanization’ of Europe’s borders. The 
‘proliferation of borders within (as well as between) societies’ leads to the rise of 
cosmopolitanism throughout these spaces(Rumford 2006, 191). As Rumford puts it, 
‘The multiplicity of communities which can emerge within and between existing 
polities makes for a greater number of border crossings: the negotiation of borders 
becomes an integral aspect of both mobilities and identities’ (2006, 191). The example 
Rumford provides to illustrate this point is the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, which, he 
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argues, multiplies borders between the EU and its neighbours in Asia and Africa, and 
confuses the categories of inside/outside that are applied to these states. The 
Neighbourhood Policy represents an extension of EU governance beyond EU borders: 
‘countries which are not likely to become official candidates for full membership can be 
brought within the orbit of the Single Market and other pan-European projects’ 
(Rumford 2006, 186). In this way the EU projects its powers beyond its borders, 
integrating the countries around it into Europe without formally shifting its geophysical 
limits or incorporating those countries into its institutions. Thus some of the border 
functions are shifted outwards while others remain in their current positions, further 
differentiating the various levels of EU borders. The Neighbourhood Policy suggests ‘a 
shift away from Fortress Europe in which borderlines must be policed vigilantly 
towards the idea of borders as buffer zones, comprising a ring of well governed and 
compliant states’ (Rumford 2006, 187). This is a vision of cosmopolitan borders, of 
crossings and exchanges across national and regional frontiers. It envisages a network 
of countries ‘drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond cooperation to 
involve a significant measure of economic and political integration’ (European 
Commission 2004). 
 
Rumford argues against the adequacy of the ‘Schengenland’ and ‘Network Europe’ 
models to explain Europe’s changing borders. Instead he argues for the idea of their 
‘cosmopolitanization.’ Borders have proliferated, becoming more numerous, more 
frequently shifted and more mobile: ‘The multiplicity of communities which can 
emerge within and between existing polities makes for a greater number of border 
crossings: the negotiation of borders becomes an integral aspect of both communities 
and identities…. national borders have been supplanted by shifting EU borders and 
borders are diffused throughout society’ (Rumford 2006, 191). The EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy exemplifies these phenomena, where fixed borders and static 
concepts of inside/outside and member/non-member are confused as borderlands are 
created. As borders become more numerous and borderlands spread, cosmopolitanism 
becomes increasingly necessary.  
 
Although Rumford concentrates on the European Neighbourhood Policy, another 
significant aspect of border proliferation occurs with the borders that are being created 
not on the edges or outside Europe, but within the metropolises of the EU itself. In Italy 
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this is exemplified in the growth of immigration detention centres or CPT (centri di 
permanenza temporanea). An article on the immigrant advocacy website Melting Pot, 
entitled ‘The Border Right through Us: CPTs and New Safety Devices in our Cities,’ 
analyses the way that CPTs allow the border to invade the heart of the city: ‘Today, the 
CPT is all around us, it’s made of ghettos and exclusion, of differentiated inclusion and 
stratifications of citizenship levels’ (Melting Pot Editorial 2007). Such a development 
supports Rumford’s argument that cosmopolitanism, in the sense of living on and 
between borders, is becoming a more and more important part of the EU structure. 
Border crossing is not something that happens only on the edge of Europe; it also occurs 
within its core metropolitan areas: ‘Ghettos, entire neighbourhoods and city areas that 
are inhabited by immigrants, because they are forced to, play an important role in the 
process of inclusion/exclusion as well …. The CPTs are an integral part of this network, 
strictly connected to the social context around them’ (Melting Pot Editorial 2007).  
 
Although providing an interesting perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Rumford’s analysis seems to overly rely on the EU’s own description of this process. 
He takes at his word, for instance, Romano Prodi’s promise of integration without 
enlargement so that the EU’s neighbours can share ‘everything but institutions’ 
(Rumford 2006, 186).2 Rather than critiquing the EU’s rhetoric he focuses on the more 
attractive aspects of this process, that corresponding to the Networked (Non)border in 
Walter’s analysis (2004) and the border as linkage in Sassen’s view (1996). But, as 
Walters argues, borders can have many different dimensions to them, and while not 
denying the existence of the elements that Rumford identifies, it is also true that the 
limes aspect of these borders should also be taken into account. That is, the 
Neighbourhood Policy may create borders as a fringe or edge, a point of exclusion 
between Europe and its outside. 
 
Despite Prodi’s rhetoric of integration in all but name (Prodi 2002), many of the 
agreements with bordering countries under the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy are 
accompanied by highly exclusionary provisions. While at the level of heads of 
government, businesses and bureaucracy there may be integration across these borders, 
                                                 
2 In 2002 Romano Prodi famously promised to those countries bordering on the EU that became involved 
in the European Neighbourhood Policy that they would be given the incentive of de facto economic 
integration with the EU as a reward for their participation (Prodi 2002).  
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at the level of the general populace barriers may, in fact, be being raised. In return for 
aid and access to markets, one of the key demands of European states and the EU in 
their agreements with developing countries in North Africa has been the introduction of 
migration control measures to prevent Africans entering European territory 
(Andrijasevic 2006, 16). This has been the case in Italy’s agreements with Libya in 
recent years, which have involved the establishment of offshore detention centres to 
control the flows of migrants to Italy (Andrijasevic 2006, 2). These requirements have 
also been present in various pilot schemes for the creation of offshore processing 
centres in North African countries, and most recently were part of the negotiations at the 
Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat, Morocco 
(Noll 2006). 
 
These negotiations suggest that concealed within the more positive dimension of the 
networked border is a vision of the border as limes. Rumford’s analysis thus needs to go 
deeper in uncovering this element of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This is not to 
say that the harsh, anti-humanitarian side of the Neighbourhood Policy and of EU 
borders in general impels a rejection of Rumford’s cosmopolitanization thesis. There is 
little doubt that borders continue to proliferate in and around the EU and that the 
cosmopolitan ability to live in and across borders is more and more necessary. But it 
does mean that the understanding of cosmopolitanism offered by Rumford has to be 
deepened beyond the jet-set, multicultural citizen of the world. Rumford does point out 
that to be cosmopolitan means much more than this; however, his analysis does not 
fully engage with the difficulties faced by the disadvantaged and marginalized in their 
border crossing, and with the sort of tactics required to deal with those borders. One 
possible answer to this omission lies in Peter Nyer’s (2003) concept of ‘abject 
cosmopolitanism,’ a term he has developed to describe the subjectivities of the migrants 
engaged in struggles to assert their rights when border control mechanisms are exercised 
against them (and in particular the practice of deportation). The activist strategies and 
tactics employed in these struggles, such as those of ‘taking place’ and ‘taking speech,’ 
suggest that cosmopolitanism involves not just living across and negotiating borders but 
also challenging and contesting them. 
 
Rumford presents a valuable synthesis of the theoretical work that has been carried out 
in recent years on the transformation of borders at both a European and a global level. 
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The introduction of the cosmopolitan concept to the theory of the border brings a useful 
new perspective by emphasising the way that borders connect up diverse territories and 
act as bridges while also dividing and partitioning. As borders proliferate both outside 
and inside the geophysical boundaries of the traditional nation-state and the European 
Union, cosmopolitanism, as a way of living in and across borders, becomes more and 
more important. This is true not only for the privileged international professional elite, 
but also for larger sections of society, including immigrants, both authorized and 
clandestine, who traverse and challenge these pre-established boundaries. However, 
Rumford’s understanding of this type of cosmopolitanism could be deepened by dealing 
more with the subjectivities and experiences of struggle of those who are forced to live 
everyday in and between the borders he describes. The concept of cosmopolitan borders 
could be expanded by taking into account the ethnographies and theoretical work of 
scholars such as Balibar (2004a; 2004b), Mezzadra (2004), Rigo (2002; 2005) and 
Nyers (2003) who are engaged, both within and outside the academy, in the 
cosmopolitan struggle for the rights of migrants. 
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